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1 Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Danish Economy:
Problems, Policies and Prospects1
Torben M. Andersen, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Ole Risager
Abstract: Over the last 25 years the Danish economy has had difficulties in growing as fast as
other EU countries and the United States. While the average growth difference is small, it
signals that if this trend persists into the next century, Denmark will not be able to maintain its
high position in the world income hierarchy. Moreover, during these years, the number of
individuals living on transfer incomes have increased dramatically. Although we interpret
both tendencies as signals of structural weaknesses, we are also aware that these developments
may reflect that other goals in economic policy have been pursued, such as protecting the
environment and/or  achieving certain redistributive objectives. This paper analyzes this and
other broad policy issues of importance for Denmark.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION: TRENDS AND CYCLES
Countries are often ranked according to their GDP per capita, properly adjusted for differences
in price levels. Based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP statistics, Denmark
is one of the most affluent societies in the world. Compared to the EU average and the OECD
average, Denmark was, respectively, 12 and 9 per cent ahead in 1995, and only a few
countries – including Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland and  the United States - had a higher
GDP per capita (The Economist, 1997). The level of real GDP was in 1997 about three times
as large as in 1950 and, from the perspective of economic welfare, it is also important to note
that over the same time period the average annual working hours have fallen by about a third.
However, Denmark’s GDP growth rate has been slightly lower than in a number of other
countries. Figure 1.1 shows real GDP for Denmark, (the average of) 15 EU countries and the
United States; in all three cases real GDP is indexed to 100 in 1960.
Note: Index numbers (1960=100).
Source: OECD.
2Over the whole period 1960-97, Denmark enjoyed an average real GDP growth rate of 2.8 per
cent. With the corresponding number being 3.0 per cent for both the EU and the United States
(see Table 1.1),  the difference in growth performance has been fairly small. However, if this
difference also persists into the next century, Denmark will of course not be able to retain its
high position among the world’s richest countries. It is also remarkable that the two sub-
periods, 1960-72 and 1973-97, respectively, are characterized by very different growth
performances. Indeed, for Denmark and the EU as a whole the GDP growth rates in the
second sub-period were only half as high as in the first.  While US growth rates have also
fallen, the decline in Europe is much more dramatic, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as
‘eurosclerosis’.
Table 1.1: Average real GDP growth in per cent, 1960-97
1960-97 1960-72 1973-97
 Denmark 2,8 4,4 2,1
 EU 3,0 4,6 2,3
 USA 3,0 3,8 2,6
Source: OECD
 The slow growth period 1973-97 was characterized by deep recessions but also by impressive
upswings. As indicated by Figure 1.2, this period saw three recessions and two expansionary
periods with growth significantly below and above the mean, respectively. The first two
recessionary periods occurred in the mid-1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, and were
mainly triggered by well known international events such as the two OPEC shocks and the
associated economic policies adopted by the leading OECD economies. The two expansionary
periods – one from 1983 to 1987, and another from 1993 until today -  were, however, mainly
driven by domestic factors, as we shall explain in more detail below. 
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Figure 1.2: Real GDP for Denmark, 1973-97
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Note: Index numbers (1960=100).
Source: OECD.
In both upturns, economic policy has played an important role in triggering the upswing in the
economy. Economic policy also played a role in setting off the recession that started in 1987
and continued until 1993, a period in which Denmark’s major trading partners were booming,
at least until the late 1980s. Hence, it is interesting to note that domestic factors and Danish
economic policy in particular have played an important role in the performance of the
economy.2 However, it is also important to stress that owing to the economy’s fairly high
degree of openness as indicated by an export share of GDP around 35 per cent as well as
strong financial linkages with the rest of the world, the economy is of course also vulnerable
to international shocks.
The international recessions associated with the two OPEC shocks are cases in point. As
shown by Figure 1.3, these shocks were followed by sharp declines in employment, while
labour supply continued to grow, actually at an increasing rate following the first OPEC
shock. The expansionary period in the mid-1980s and the current boom starting in 1993 were
both associated with sharp increases in employment, but it has not so far been possible to
4Figure 1.3: Labour supply and employment in heads, 1960-97
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bring the unemployment rate down to the level prevailing prior to the adverse shocks of the
1970s. Over the years, a number of measures have therefore been adopted to cope with the
unemployment problem. Most of the measures have been passive in nature, aiming at
reducing the registered unemployment rate by lowering labour supply through early retirement
schemes, paid leave schemes and so forth. More recently, initiatives have been taken which
directly aim at bringing the unemployed back to work again (see section 1.3). 
Note: Numbers are in thousands. Figures for 1997 are preliminary.
Source: Statistics Denmark and Ministry of Economics, Denmark.
The persistent high level of unemployment has had strong effects on the government budget,
as elaborated in section 1.6. This is to be expected for a welfare state like the Danish one since
a key objective is to moderate the effects of recessions. There has thus been a rapid increase in
public sector transfer payments, while traditional public sector activities have not increased
relative to GDP since the 1970s. The number of individuals living on UI benefits and other
public transfer payments has thus increased enormously (see section 1.7).
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Although the tax burden also has been increasing, there has been a persistent gap between
revenues and expenditures. This has, of course, led to increasing government debt over the
years. While the current government debt-to-GDP ratio is below the average in the EU, it
remains a fact that the debt and the burden of debt service are significant. Moreover, it may be
argued that the government finances are intergenerationally imbalanced,  suggesting that
significant bills will be passed onto future generations. The extent to which this is the case is
discussed further in section 1.8. 
The high growth in the 1960s led to a gradual build-up of goods and service price inflation
which culminated in the mid-1970s owing to the sharp increase in energy prices and the wage
hikes (see Figure 1.4). Following these events, inflation declined but both price and wage
inflation remained high until the beginning of the 1980s. In late 1982, there was a shift in
economic policy towards a disinflationary policy strategy that helped bringing inflation under
control. This is addressed in greater detail in section 1.4.
Source: OECD.
An important element of this non-accommodative policy strategy was the shift towards a fixed
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exchange rate policy. Earlier, policy makers had quite often resorted to currency devaluations
in an attempt to offset the deteriorations in competitiveness and the current account that
resulted from high wage and energy price increases. Indeed, as we discuss at length in section
1.5, the external (im)balance was for long seen as the Achilles’ heel in the Danish economy.
This is witnessed by the fact that there was a deficit on the current account in each of the
consecutive years from 1964 to 1989 (see Figure 1.5). 
Source: Statistics Denmark.
As a background to the more detailed treatment of selected issues of importance for the
macroeconomic performance of the Danish economy, section 1.2 provides a brief overview of
the different economic policy strategies that have been pursued in recent decades.
1.2 GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY STRATEGIES
The growth period in the 1960s led to an optimistic view about the possibilities for fine-tuning
the macroeconomy. The subsequent developments showed that macroeconomic management
was very difficult and a variety of different policy strategies were pursued in an attempt to
7improve upon macroeconomic performance. The initial response to the international recession
and the rise in unemployment in the mid 1970s was a so-called ‘bridging policy’. This policy
was based on the perception that the recession was temporary and could therefore be mitigated
by an expansionary demand management policy.
The perception that the recession was temporary soon proved wrong, and the overall policy
strategy from the mid 1970s up to 1982 was guided by a so-called ‘switching strategy’
according to which the twin problems of unemployment and current account deficits could be
solved by switching private demand with a high import ratio into public demand with a low
import ratio. As a consequence, numerous policy packages included tax increases to curtail
private demand and expansions of public demand and in particular public employment
programmes. These changes did not necessarily take place simultaneously as the policy had a
‘stop-go’ character with tax increases in times where the current account was considered out
of control and public expansion in periods with focus on the unemployment problem. 
This was also the prime time for policy packages, appearing frequently in an atmosphere of
acute need for intervention. A loose exchange rate policy (crawling peg) was part of this
strategy since discrete devaluations were believed to undo the harms caused by excessive
domestic wage increases. Underlying this policy view was an accommodative attitude towards
the labour market in the sense that the government accepted a responsibility for the
employment level. Accordingly, the labour market policy was fairly passive, mainly
concentrating on reducing labour supply and mitigating the economic consequences for the
unemployed. This policy strategy was not very successful in terms of solving the overall
macro problems. The problems of current account deficits and unemployment remained un-
solved, while inflation and public debt were growing.
In the autumn of 1982, a centre-right minority coalition replaced a Social Democratic minority
government. The new government launched a new economic programme based on the idea
that the problems underlying the Danish economy could be solved in a medium-term
perspective only by an expansion of private sectors capable of facing international
8competition. The programme consisted of a disinflationary policy grounded in a fixed
exchange rate policy and a tight fiscal policy. The policy shift signalled that the government
was attempting to leave more responsibility for the determination of employment with the
labour market.
This disinflationary policy was initially very successful and a change in the economic mood
was observed accompanied by increases in private demand, higher GDP growth and a fall in
unemployment from 1983 to 1986 (see Figure 1.7, p.18). This policy was to some extent
killed by its own success (see Andersen, 1994 and Bergman and Hutchison, Chapter 8 in this
volume). The tremendous upturn in the mid 1980s was associated with a substantial increase
in domestic demand as both private consumption and investment soared, but it turned out that
supply capacity could not match this increase. 
The capacity problems applied both to the production capacity of firms and the availability of
labour with the necessary qualifications. As a consequence, it led to a further deterioration of
the current account and wage increases (in 1987) much in excess of the norms of the
disinflationary policy. The development over this period was interesting since domestic
demand was booming. Therefore, shortage of aggregate demand could be ruled out as the
primary reason for the unemployment problem. The fact that substantial wage increases were
released at an unemployment rate around 8 per cent was taken as strong indication that there
were severe adjustment problems in the labour market.
A fairly pessimistic view on the unemployment problem developed during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and the view that 'we have to live with unemployment' and 'there is no need for
so much labour' became fairly widespread. A minority coalition government led by the Social
Democrats took over in 1993. Among its new initiatives was a paid leave scheme (see p.40),
aiming at distributing the burden of unemployment more equally. It also launched a fiscal
expansion, partly financing the transition period of a tax reform designed so as to lower
marginal tax rates and broaden the tax base.
9Although a shift in the business cycle was to be expected after a prolonged recession, there is
little  doubt that the expansionary fiscal policy had a role in triggering the boom in economic
activity and the fall in unemployment. The accompanying increase in employment motivated a
more active labour market policy focusing much more explicitly on the incentive effects of
various labour market policies. The policy shift towards youth - involving a tightening of the
incentive structure -  is a prime example of this. There is some indication that the wage
formation process has been affected, but it is still too early to judge how fundamental these
changes are. Nonetheless, recent developments have shown that a combination of demand and
active supply measures - a two-handed approach - can be successfully used to boost em-
ployment.
1.3 WAGES AND STRUCTURAL SHIFTS IN THE LABOUR MARKET
Denmark experienced increasing wage inflation during the 1960s. In the mid-1970s, wage
inflation reached a climax as nominal wages increased by more than 20 per cent, see Figure
1.4. This led to an increase in real (consumption) wages by almost 10 per cent. Since then
wage inflation has gradually declined. The major downward adjustment occurred from 1982
to 1983-84, where the annual wage increases fell from around 10 to less than 5 per cent. The
considerable decline in wage inflation shows that the shift towards the low-inflation, non-
accommodative policy stance in late 1982 gained a fairly high degree of credibility rather
quickly among the wage setters in the economy. Since then wage inflation has been fairly low.
The only exception to this rule is 1987, where there was a revitalization of wage inflation
primarily due to rapid growth and increasing employment, which coincided with a new round
of collective wage bargaining. Due to the wage hike in 1987 and the tightening of economic
policy, unemployment increased substantially whereas wage inflation declined. It is only very
recently that employment has started to rise again; from the beginning of 1993 to late 1997,
total employment increased by around 150,000 persons or by almost 8 per cent.
The considerable rise in employment that has taken place since 1994 has not so far led to an
accelerating wage inflation, which is somewhat surprising given past experience. There are
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several potential explanations for this. First, it should be noted that the present employment
increase is not as big as the one observed in the mid-1980s, where private sector employment
grew by almost 200.000 persons. Second, the coincidence of a low and stable inflation and
falling unemployment may simply reflect a learning process. Thus, the experience in the
1980s clearly demonstrates that pressing for ‘too’ high wage increases is futile as the only
certain outcome is higher unemployment and very little else. Third, fierce competition in
goods and service markets associated with the increased international integration process,
often noted by the business community, may also have helped to hold back wage and price
increases. Indeed, since the coincidence of low inflation and falling unemployment is also a
world-wide phenomenon, a truly international explanation has some appeal. Fourth, the labour
market reforms outlined below may also have contributed, as argued by Hansen and Tranæs in
Chapter 11. These reforms, undertaken in 1994 and 1996, represent a gradual tightening of
previous policies (see also Blomgren-Hansen’s comments on Chapter 11).
There are several elements in these reforms. First, there is an increased attempt to avoid
mismatch and bottlenecks. Thus, regional labour market councils have been endowed with
additional instruments in order to avoid the fallacies of the mid 1980s. Second, there has been
a tightening of benefit eligibility requirements. Access to UI benefits now requires 52 weeks
of work over the last three years as opposed to 26 weeks before. The maximum period on
benefits has been reduced to five years. Third, insured unemployed persons can no longer
extend their period on UI benefits through job training, and uninsured unemployed persons
(outside the UI benefit system) can no longer earn their right to UI benefits through subsidized
jobs provided by local authorities. The previously existing possibility of receiving UI benefits
‘for life’ thus no longer exists. Fourth, work availability requirements and enforcement have
also been tightened in general and in particular as regards young unemployed workers below
25 years of age. The new rules stipulate that benefits should be activated after an
unemployment spell of less than six months, and at a 50 per cent reduction of the benefit
level. Finally, each unemployed is, in collaboration with the local authority,  supposed to work
out a plan for education or job training that eventually will lead to an exit from
unemployment.
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Figure 1.6: Re lative  wage and employment, 1948-1991
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Another interesting feature of the wage formation process is the compression of wages that
occurred until the beginning of the 1980s. To illustrate this phenomenon in a simple way,
Figure 1.6 plots the relative wage between unskilled and skilled male workers over the period
1948-91. The diagram also shows the relative employment level between the two types of
labour measured along the right-hand axis.
Note: Employment figures are only available until 1991 due to a new wage-employment survey method.
Source: Risager (1993) and Danish Employers’ Federation.
In the period from 1964 to the beginning of the 1980s, the relative wage between unskilled
and skilled labour increased -that is, wage differentials declined. Declining wage differentials
were, however, also associated with declining job opportunities for the unskilled workers
insofar as the relative employment level declined. As unskilled labour became more expensive
in relative terms, firms reduced their demand for unskilled workers and increased their
demand for skilled labour (see Risager, 1993). This study therefore lends support to the view
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that the concentration of high unemployment among unskilled and inexperienced workers is in
part due to the compressed wage structure. 
The unequal unemployment distribution is documented in Table 1.2. There is clear evidence
that Denmark suffers in particular from high unemployment among low-skill groups, but it
also appears that unequal unemployment distribution is an international phenomenon. It is
therefore likely that there are other important explanations to which we return when we have
further highlighted the role of wages. 
Table 1.2: Unemployment rates for 25-64 year-olds by level of educational attainment, 
1995
Below upper Upper Non-university University- All levels
secundary secondary tertiary level of
Countries education education education education education
Austria       5.7     2.9      1.4     2.1      3.5
Denmark     14.6     8.3      5.3     4.3    10.0
Germany     13.3     7.9      5.2     4.7      8.1
Netherlands       7.9     4.8       a     4.1      5.6
USA     10.0     5.0      3.6     2.5      4.7
Source:   OECD (1997a)
Jensen, Rosenholm and Smith (1994) also show that part of the unemployment problem in
Denmark has to do with too high wages, and in particular with too high entrant wages. Their
statistical analysis shows  that 25 per cent of young unemployed men and 15 percent of young
unemployed female workers are unable to live up to the entrant wage - that is, their
productivity is not high enough - and that is why firms are unwilling to employ them.
However, they also show that a fall in the entrant wage by 10 per cent will lead to a
substantial increase in employment among this group of workers.
Proposals of this kind have been ‘vetoed’ by the trade unions. Our interpretation of their
13
attitude is inspired by contemporary economic labour market theory: as a fall in entrant wages
is likely also to reduce wage growth for the incumbent workers due to increased outsider
competition, a fall in entrant wages is likely to lead to a loss for the majority of the incumbent
workers. Against this, we have the gain associated with the increase in employment and
income for those who change status from unemployed to employed. However, as the latter
group is a minority amongst the members of the unions, the trade union policy stance seems
clear.
Another concern has been the extent to which a reduction in entrant wages will lead to social
imbalances. It is therefore of interest briefly to discuss the income distribution effects of a fall
in entry wages. In the short term, income distribution among the employed workers will
obviously become more unequal, whereas the distribution within the potential workforce is a
more complicated matter as those workers who move from unemployment into employment
will experience an increase in income,  provided that UI benefits also are reduced in line with
entrant wages. In order to get a feeling for the long-term effects, it is important to know
something about wage dynamics - that is, the speed by which workers move up the income
ladder.
Bingley, Bjørn and Westergaard-Nielsen (1994) have studied this issue by following a group
of workers belonging to the lowest income decile in 1981. After five years, 75 per cent of
those workers had climbed up the ladder. Hence, there were only 25 per cent left in the low
wage decile. More than 55 per cent had reached the third decile or higher plateaus in the
earnings hierarchy. The fairly high degree of wage mobility shows that ‘low pay status’ is not
a life-time stigma for the vast majority of the wage earners. The introduction of low entrant
wages will therefore provide opportunities to many outsiders who are unable at present to get
a job. Needless to say, there will always be a small group who are unable to move up the
ladder. Many of these persons are now squeezed out of the market, living on unemployment
benefits or other transfer payments. Finally, as regards the functional income distribution, a
stretchning of the income distribution towards a higher proportion of incomes just below the
present minimum wage will of course increase the return to capital.
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Because the UI system sets a maximum benefit level, UI benefits are of greater value to the
low-paid than to the high-paid unemployed workers, and it is therefore also likely that the UI
system is an important explanation of the narrow wage differentials (see Andersen and
Risager, 1990, and Hansen,  Pedersen and Sløk, 1996). Pedersen, Smith and Stephensen
(Chapter 6 in this volume) estimate wage equations using panel data, and they also find that
UI benefits affect workers’ wage demands - as indeed any labour market model would
suggest. Moreover, the effects are largest for low-income groups.
Since probably all political parties in Denmark – at least those likely to take office - seem
unwilling to cut the unemployment benefit level in a significant way, as recommended by, for
example, the OECD (1997b), the option ‘reduce benefits-lower wages-increase employment’
is not really on the policy agenda. In this context it should, however, be noted that the
OECD’s summary measure of benefit generosity shows that Denmark has the most generous
system among all 21 countries in the OECD (1997b) study. A recent study by the Danish
Economic Council (Det Økonomiske Råd, 1997) also shows that a large proportion of low-
skilled/low-paid have no incentives to get employed when account is taken of taxes and
transfers. Thus, more than 40 per cent of those who are unemployed for more than 80 per cent
of the year, has an effective replacement ratio that exceeds 90 per cent. Moreover, there are
also many low paid employed workers who have no economic incentive to work.
The philosophy of the present government is to preserve the high benefit level while at the
same time increasing the demands that society puts on those who collect benefits and welfare
money in general. In this context, it is interesting to note that following the tightening of the
work availabilty and benefit eligibility conditions for young unemployed workers mentioned
earlier, the unemployment problem for this group of workers disappeared rather quickly; it is
probably important to note that the elimination of the youth unemployment problem occurred
simultaneously with an upswing in the economy. Finally, it should be mentioned that the
generous UI system has made it easy for firms to lay-off workers not only in recessions but
also at other times where firms find it desirable to reduce the workforce. That feature of the
system is one among several reasons why the Danish hiring-firing system is highly flexible in
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an international context (see also Emerson, 1988). The latter aspect may also help to explain
why employers’ federations seem to have accepted the high UI benefit level in spite of the fact
that it increases firms’ direct wage costs.
The concentration of unemployment among low-skill groups is likely to reflect a compressed
wage structure, but other factors are probably also at play, as indicated by the simple
observation that other countries like the United States, characterized by a very unequal wage
distribution, also to some extent suffer from this problem. Technological progress may play a
role insofar as investments in new technology may lead to an increase in the demand for
skilled and highly educated persons relative to unskilled workers. Unfortunately, it is hard to
measure technical progress and how it has changed over time. This clearly complicates testing
this hypothesis (see, however, Economic Council, 1997).
Owing to the unwillingness to implement policies that make low-productivity workers more
competitive via the (wage) price mechanism and to the view that part or probably most of the
unemployment problem is caused by technical progress and an inadequate skill structure,
increased emphasis has been put on making the unemployed more competitive via education
and training efforts. Whether the strong emphasis on education and training is enough to bring
about a substantial reduction of the structural unemployment problem is an issue that goes
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, there is evidence which indicates that some of
these initiatives have very little impact. For example, a statistical study of the (unemployed)
individuals who participated in the so-called AMU (labour market training) programmes
shows that the probability that they get a job afterwards is not higher than non-participants’
probability of finding a job, controlling for a number of other factors (see Jensen and Jensen,
1996). The social return of this targeted but fairly expensive investment-in-education
programme has therefore been questioned. Another policy option that has been discussed
recently is to give low-income individuals better incentives to participate actively in the labour
market through a so-called earned income tax credit (see Sørensen, 1997, and Economic
Council, 1997). 
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In recent years, the Danish collective wage bargaining system has changed from being a
mixture of centralized and decentralized bargaining to a predominantly decentralized system.
Thus, since the beginning of the 1990s almost 90 per cent of the workers in the manual labour
market have been on the so-called minimum wage system. Under this system, trade unions
and their counterparts on the employer side negotiate a base wage level. The minimum wage
level varies across occupations. To give some indication, the average Danish base wage level
is roughly twice as high as the legislated minimum wage in the United States. On top of that,
there is a supplement negotiated at the local level between management and workers. The
bottom line is thus that entrant wages in firms may be considerable above the minimum wage
level. The  movement towards more decentralized wage bargaining has so far not led to an
increase in wage differentials across workers.
In view of the fact that the public sector is a large employer, it should be noted that wage
negotiations in the public sector often follow private negotiations. Moreover, the agreements
usually mimic the agreements in the private market - that is, certain wage indexation clauses
attempt to link wage increases in the public sector to the wage increases granted in the local
private negotiations. For more than a decade, wages in the public sector have, however,
declined relative to the private sector. In the public sector, there has also been an attempt to
increase the element of decentralized wage negotiations and to allow for more flexibility in
the pay schedule.
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1.4 EXCHANGE RATES, PRICES AND INTEREST RATES
Denmark has over the years taken part in various schemes for monetary cooperation in
Europe, starting with the so-called ‘snake’ arrangement set up in 1972, and at present
Denmark participates in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) within the European Monetary
System (EMS).3 The official position has for long been that Denmark pursues a fixed
exchange rate policy, but what that really means has changed over the years. In particular in
the late 1970s a crawling peg policy was effectively followed as the Danish government
undertook four discrete devaluations in the period 1979-82. 
The crawling peg era was abandoned in late 1982 when the new government declared a fixed
exchange rate policy as an integral part of its disinflationary policy. This policy remains in
force and enjoys broad political support. Although the precise meaning of the fixed exchange
rate policy has never been explicitly defined it is understood to have the D-mark as its
reference point.
The shifts in exchange rate policy are clearly mirrored in the development of inflation (Figure
1.5) and in nominal interest rates (Figure 1.7). Indeed, nominal interest rates peaked in 1982
and fell fairly rapidly after the initiation of the disinflationary policy based on a fixed
exchange rate policy (see Andersen and Risager, 1988). Since then inflation has remained at a
low level below the European average.
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Figure 1.7:  Nom ina l  Inte rest R a te  a nd Inte re st R a te
S p r e a d to Germ a ny, 1969-1997
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Note: Nominal interest rate: effective rate of return on bonds (iwbz), interest spread: nominal interest rate less
effectove rate of return on long-term bonds in Germany (iwbdm).
Sources: ADAM-Databank and Statistics Denmark.
That the fall in nominal interest rates is tightly related to the exchange rate policy is also seen
from Figure 1.7, which shows the interest rate spread between Denmark and Germany. It is 
apparent that along with the establishment of a credible fixed exchange rate policy and,
accordingly, an inflation convergence to the German standard, the interest rate spread has
diminished dramatically. The fact that there in periods has been a moderate interest rate spread
between Denmark and Germany can be taken to reflect the fact that financial markets do not
rule out the possibility of a return to a more inflationary policy, in particular given the Danish
opt-out position on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Although nominal interest rates have fallen rapidly, this is not the case for real interest rates,
as revealed by Figure 1.8. The real after-tax interest rate is still fairly high, but has
nevertheless fallen since 1993. The fairly high interest rates that have prevailed since the late
1970s is an important explanation why the excess return on stocks relative to bonds has been
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Figure 1.8: Nom ina l  and Real  Rate s of Inte rest, 1951-1997
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modest. However, in the last 30 years, the market portfolio of stocks has outperformed bonds,
but not by as much as in many other countries (see Nielsen and Risager, Chapter 3 in this
volume, and the comments by Björn Hansson).
Note: Nominal interest rate: effectiv rate of return on bonds (iwbz), real rate of interest: nominal interest rate
less actual inflation measured by the GDP-deflator, real after tax interest rate: nominal interest rate after tax
(tsa0u) less actual inflation.
Sources: ADAM-Databank and Statistics Denmark.
The shift towards greater 'fixity' in the conduct of exchange rate policy has gone hand in hand
with initiatives to deregulate capital markets. Thus, capital markets have been gradually
liberalized since the late 1950s, both domestically and towards the international capital
markets. These reforms were completed in the early 1980s when practically all legal
restrictions on international capital mobility (in and out of Denmark) were eliminated. Rules
and regulations for financial intermediaries have also been liberalized, implying that binding
credit constraints for private households have been eased. These liberalizations were
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important for not only the reduction in the interest rate spread but also for the fall in interest
rates. As the interest rate spread is primarily determined by exchange rate expectations, there
would  be no spread with fully liberalized capital movements and a credible fixed exchange
rate.
Financial factors have been important for the expansionary period in both the 1980s and the
1990s. In both periods there was a tremendous increase in loan-financed consumption. In the
latter period house-owners had an opportunity to make loan conversions to exploit the falling
nominal interest rates, and this clearly contributed to fuelling private consumption. The
development in the real estate market is very important in this respect, because the value of
owner-occupied houses constitutes by far the most dominant wealth item for most households. 
Moreover, in both of these periods substantial increases - in the order of 20-30 per cent - in
the real price of houses have been observed. This has caused large wealth increases which in
turn have boosted private consumption. Capital market liberalizations have clearly contributed
to strengthen this channel, and empirical evidence shows now a closer relationship between
changes in consumption and changes in wealth than previously (see, for example, Christensen,
1987, and Callesen, 1997).
As is well known, the Maastricht Treaty implies three nominal convergence criteria and two
fiscal convergence criteria. A broad political spectrum in Denmark remains committed to the
underlying principles of nominal convergence and fiscal discipline. Based on 1997 figures
Denmark fulfils all the economic criteria for entering EMU. Also, Denmark is at the forefront
of implementing the directives behind the EU’s Internal Market programme. Despite these
tendencies to play the role as Europe's ‘top boy’,  Denmark has stated that it will not
participate in the third stage of EMU in Europe. Indeed, Denmark has already exercised its
right to opt out through the so-called Edinburgh Agreement in the European Council in
December 1992. Denmark may reverse that position, but this would be subject to a positive
outcome of a referendum. Currently, it seems difficult to predict the chances of full Danish
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participation in EMU.
The official Danish position is clearly to seek the closest possible arrangement with EMU
participants. Since it now turns out that the euro will become a reality from the beginning of
1999, a likely approach to be followed by Denmark is one of a unilateral peg vis-à-vis the
euro. This would be an arrangement similar to that pursued by Austria of pegging to the 
D-mark for about two decades before Austria joined the EU and the EMS (see Thygesen,
1996, and his discussion in this volume of the relationship between insiders and outsiders in
EMU). Indeed, such an arrangement might provide an adequate defence for the krone, as long
as macroeconomic policies remain closely aligned with those of the EMU countries.
1.5 SAVING, INVESTMENT, THE CURRENT ACCOUNT AND FOREIGN DEBT
The current account of the balance of payments is the difference between national saving and
investment. Any gap between national saving and investment is thus filled by foreign saving -
that is, by foreign lending/financing of domestic private or public investments. Hence, the
current account leads by definition to a change in a country’s net foreign asset position by a
figure that is equal to the current account itself. On top of that, the net foreign asset position
may change due to re(de)valuations or asset price changes in general, which alter the value of
assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency. Below, we outline both the trend and
the cyclical movement of the current account.
The Danish current account was in deficit every single year in the period 1963-90. The
persistent deficits have, of course, led to a gradual build up of the country’s foreign debt
position (see Figure 1.9).
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The magnitude of the debt burden measured in terms of annual GDP culminated in 1988,
where the debt-GDP ratio was around 40 per cent. Owing to the persistent current account
surpluses since 1990 and to the growth in GDP, the debt-GDP ratio has now fallen to about 20
percent - that is, there has been a significant reduction of the country’s foreign indebtedness.
There are of course many reasons underlying the persistent historical tendency to run deficits,
and the turning around of this trend which took place in 1990 (see Nielsen and Søndergaard,
1991). Below, we concentrate mainly on the most important explanations of the recent surplus
trend.
To this end it is useful to consider the private and public saving-investment diagrams, which
show two important things. First, there was a considerable increase in private sector saving
after 1986. Secondly, the investment share was low, in particular in the private sector until the
mid 1990s.  Both tendencies contribute to the turning around of the current account balance.
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Figure 10b: Government gross investment and saving,1973-96
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Figure 10a: Private gross investment and saving, 1973-96
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Source: Statistics Denmark.
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Figure 10c: Total gross investments and saving, 1973-96
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The private sector is now a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In an accounting sense,
the entire foreign debt is therefore a liability of the public sector, and mainly the government.
The two most important explanations of the considerable increase in private saving are the so-
called ‘potato diet’ (credit market tightenings)  introduced in late 1986 and the tax reform in
1987. The latter led to a drastic rise in the after-tax interest rate. As the nominal interest rate
was around 10 per cent in 1987, the after-tax interest rate increased from 2.8 per cent to 5 per
cent for many private citizens. Because the private sector at that time was a net debtor, not
only the substitution effect (it became more costly to borrow) but also the income effect (the
debt service burden increased) worked in the direction of an increase in saving. The rise in
private saving has more than offset the fall in public saving. Hence, the national saving rate
has gone up. 
Since 1987, the investment share has been low, and it is only very recently that the investment
share has reached previous heights. New national account figures have led to a considerable
upward revision of investment figures, partly because IT expenditures now are classified as
investments and not as intermediate inputs. In 1996, the new estimate for the investment share
is 0.21. Likewise, savings figures have also been revised in an upward direction. Due to the
appearance of the new national account figures for the period 1988-964, earlier worries about
too low thrift and business capital investment have faded somewhat.
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The movement of the current account is closely related to the business cycle. The general
picture is that high growth is accompanied by a weaker current account, and vice versa. The
last three business cycles clearly illustrate this phenomenon. The boom from 1983-7, driven
by high growth in consumption and investment, caused a big deficit in 1986 of nearly 6 per
cent of GDP. This motivated a tightening of economic policy in general and a change in the
tax treatment of interest payments in particular, and this marked the beginning of a long
period of low growth from 1987 to 1993. As a consequence the external account  improved.
Following the economic recovery in 1993, the current account has gradually become weaker
as anticipated, but the new tendency is that the current account has remained in a surplus.
However, as the current account plays a key role for Danish macroeconomic policy making, a
considerable weakening is also the signal that may lead the present government to tighten
policy.
The role of the current account as a discipline device on macroeconomic policy making has
been criticized in recent years (see Corden ,l994, Lund ,1989, and Nielsen, l988).  The point
of departure of this criticism is the intertemporal approach. According to this line of thinking
households and firms make their saving and investment decisions such that they fulfil their
intertemporal budget constraints, which is basically saying that over their whole life-time
agents do not spend more than they earn. When that is the case they do not pass burdens onto
future generations - that is, there is no risk of free-riding on future generations. Hence,
households consumption-saving decisions are what they should be and firms’ investment
decisions are also optimal. Now since the current account is essentially the difference between 
saving and investment, the current account is what the current account should be. Thus, if
households decide to have very high consumption for a decade, say, and hence supply very
little savings to finance firms’ investment projects, then that is perfectly acceptable because
firms can then get the finance via international sources. According to this so-called ‘new
view’, the associated current account deficit should be of no concern for policy makers.
The only snag here is the public sector. Because it is not clear what the public sector  is
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optimizing, the public sector may have a tendency to run too large deficits, reflecting the fact
that politicians have an incentive to give presents rather than taxing individuals in order to be
popular and get reelected. Hence, according to the ‘new view’, the current account is only a
political problem if the public sector is imbalanced.
In order briefly to discuss the ‘new view’, it is important first to note that it is certainly true
that a deficit may be perfectly sensible insofar as it may simply reflect high domestic
profitability (above the foreign level) and investment. In such a situation it will of course be
foolish to run surpluses because it is more profitable to channel domestic saving into domestic
than into foreign investments. The underlying view that private saving-investment decisions
should not be of any concern is, however, problematic for many reasons; only a few will be
discussed here.
Although frequently assumed in text-books, international capital markets are by no means
'perfect'. Country risk is a well known and important practical phenomenon. Thus, if a country
runs large deficits and accumulates high foreign debt, it becomes more costly and difficult for
otherwise sound investment projects to get finance in the international markets. Hence, there
is an externality (negative) from the country’s outstanding debt to individual loan conditions,
and the aggregate debt is thus a figure that policy makers should be concerned with as they
should be concerned with other externalities in the economy. Many examples in history also
show that persistent current account deficits tend to make countries more vulnerable to
speculative currency attacks, in which case foreign investors pull their money out of the
country, which in turn may lead to turmoil and impede a sensible development of the
economy. This may also reflect capital market imperfections, but it may also reflect the fact
that markets rationally discount that high debt is associated with a positive probability that
countries will renege on their payback promises5 in which case foreign investors may prefer
not to park their capital in that particular country or region of the world. Again, policy makers
should care about the current account to avoid too large deficits. 
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Besides capital market imperfections, deviations from rationality may also justify some
current account targeting. Thus, if agents over several years behave as if it is cheap to borrow
just because nominal interest rates are low, whereas real interest rates are actually high,
governments and central banks with a highly professional staff may also try to correct such
false beliefs, and in practice this may result in, for example, interventions against private
consumption because announcements in themselves may have little credibility and hence
impact on the private sector. The ‘new view’ has had little effect on policy making in
Denmark, but the school’s emphasis on finding the reasons underlying a(ny) particular current
account figure is certainly valuable.
1.6 PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND TAXATION
The government has been increasingly involved in the Danish economy over the last 35 years
(see Figure 1.11). The ratio of general government expenditures to GDP has more than
doubled, from 25 per cent in 1960 to 62 per cent in 1997.
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Figure 1.11: General government expenditures in per cent of 
GDP, 1960-96
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It is mainly within the ‘core’ areas of the welfare state that outlays have increased (see also
Andersen and Schmidt, Chapter 9 in this volume). The most expanding area has thus been
transfer payments, which have increased fourfold.  Government consumption, including
health and education costs, grew rapidly in the 1960s, but has grown more or less in line with
GDP since the mid 1970s.  Government investment, on the other hand, has been in decline as
a share of GDP.  Reflecting the steady increase in public debt since the early 1970s, interest
expenditures have also risen.
The rise in transfer payments is to a large extent attributable to the rise in (the structural rate
of) unemployment.  Not only has the registered rate of unemployment increased substantially,
but there has also been a rise in the number of working-age persons depending on some sort of
income-compensating public transfer payment other than unemployment benefits. In
particular, two tendencies can be identified: the workforce is retiring earlier, and a larger
number of (mainly low-skilled) workers have been expelled from the labour market. These
developments have clearly had budgetary effects: the costs of benefits for the unemployed and
retirees have increased and tax revenues have fallen.
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Although a rising share of government spending to GDP is a phenomenon that has been
observed in most industrial countries (see Masson and Mussa, 1995), Denmark has, like other
Scandinavian countries, undoubtedly carried the welfare state further than most other
European countries, both in terms of coverage and generosity (see Hagen et al., 1998). For
example, safety nets have not only been provided for the less fortunate in society, but as a
result of the so-called ‘universalist’ approach to the welfare state, relatively generous social
programmes have been extended to the general population.
The generosity of the Danish welfare programmes may also be reflected in the way many
transfer payments have been indexed.  For example, in the area of public pensions to the
elderly, evidence shows that the purchasing power of public pensions increased by more than
real wages of blue-collar workers over the period 1970-92 (see Socialkommissionen, 1993).
A  certain ‘sense of entitlement’ may also have become particularly widespread in Denmark
and other Scandinavian welfare states.  An example is early retirement benefits which were
introduced in 1979 as a temporary measure to improve job opportunities for young workers by
stimulating elderly workers to leave the workforce. However, most people now feel
themselves entitled to receive public retirement benefits at the age of 60, regardless of their
health status (or other conditions). It has, therefore, become difficult to scale back these
benefits.
The extent of public sector involvement in the Danish economy may also be assessed from the
revenue side of the (general) government budget (see Figure 1.12). 
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Figure 1.12: General governm e nt revenues in pe r cent of GDP,
1960-96
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While the total revenue share is above 60 per cent, the revenue from taxes constitutes about 50
per cent of GDP. Against an EU (average) and US comparison, these numbers may appear
very high (see table 1.3). Indeed, it is remarkable that the total revenue to GDP ratio in
Denmark is almost twice as high as the corresponding US figure, with the EU average being
somewhere in between. However, when comparing the Danish tax burden with that of other
European countries, it should be kept in mind that most EU countries, unlike Denmark,  pay
transfers on a net-of-tax basis.  Another difference has to do with the way households are
supported: in some countries this takes the form of deductions from the tax base, whereas in
Denmark this is done through direct transfer payments. These factors have been found to
account for almost five percentage points of the difference in the gross tax rate between
Denmark and Germany (see Ministry of Finance, 1994, and Lassen and Nielsen, 1996).
From a public finance perspective it is not only the level but also the structure of taxation
which is of interest. Table 1.3 compares the relative importance of the major tax sources in
Denmark, the EU (average) and the United States.
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Table 1.3: The structure of the tax system in Denmark, EU and USA, 1994
Denmark EU USA
              (% of total tax receipts)
Social Security contributions
    Employees' 2.5 10.2 10.8
    Employers' 0.7 8.1 13.3
Personal income taxes 53.8 26.5 35.7
Corporate taxes 3.7 6.4 8.9
Taxes on goods and services 32.0 31.4 17.9
Other taxes 7.3 9.2 13.3
Total tax receipts (% of GDP) 51.6 42.5 27.6
Source: OECD (1998).
There are several notable differences between Denmark and the rest of the world. First, the
earmarked contributions (payroll taxes to social security) of employers and employees count
relatively more in the EU and, especially, in the United States. Indeed, while such payroll
taxes only constitute about 4 per cent of total taxes in Denmark, they constitute about a fifth in
the EU as a whole and even higher in the United States.  The tendency in Denmark is,
however, to give a higher priority to such taxes in the future, see below. Second, personal
income taxes make up a significantly larger share of the tax revenue in Denmark than in
Europe in general and in the United States. More precisely, while the revenue from personal
income taxes constitutes more than a half of the total tax revenue in Denmark, the
corresponding figures for the EU and the United States are only about a quarter and a third,
respectively. Third, corporate taxes are used on a relatively smaller scale in Denmark than in
the rest of the OECD, notably in the United States. Fourth, the revenue collected from taxes
on goods and services has in recent years converged on the European average, now amounting
to about a third of the total revenue. In the United States, however, indirect taxes count much
less. VAT is by far the most important indirect tax in Denmark, accounting for more than 50
per cent of the total indirect tax revenue. Fifth, since much of private sector interest income
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Figure 1.13: Gross gove rnm e nt de b t in  per ce n t of GDP, 
1960-96
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
benefits from special tax concessions, while interest payments are fully deductible from
taxable income, capital income tax in Denmark yields a negative net revenue.6 This fact partly
explains why the residual category ‘other taxes’ is substantially lower in Denmark than in
other parts of the world. 
Although the share of government revenues has risen strongly in this period, increases have
not been sufficient to balance government budgets. As a result of persistent deficits, primarily
since the mid-1970s, there has been a substantial increase in the (gross) government debt to
GDP ratio, from 5 per cent in 1970 to almost 80 per cent in 1996 (see Figure 1.13). Apart
from the falling debt ratios in the mid 1980s,  and again more recently under the current
upturn,  the ratio has been steadily increasing.
Sources: ADAM-Databank, Statistical Yearbook (1962, 1968, 1972), Ministry of Finance.
Although the government budget thus displays a cyclical pattern, an important asymmetry can
be identified: the surplus in ‘good’ years (if  a surplus) is significantly smaller than the deficit
in ‘bad’ years. For example, while the Danish economy is currently experiencing a strong
boom,  the government only ran a small budget surplus in absolute amount in 1997. The major
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contribution to the falling debt to GDP ratio currently observed is thus the high GDP growth
rates (‘the denominator’) rather than big surpluses on the government budget (‘the
numerator’).  However, according to official projections the government is expected to run
more substantial budget surpluses, thereby supporting the official debt target of the
government which is a debt to GDP ratio of 40 per cent by year 2005.7
It should also be noted that since the late 1970s inflation has increasingly been anticipated, so
inflation has become a less powerful device for eroding the real value of government debt.
The more recent phenomenon of low (expected and actual) inflation, which has led to low
nominal interest rates, has clearly diminished the burden of existing government debt in
nominal terms. 
While the public sector has grown larger in the Scandinavian countries than elsewhere in the
OECD, this is not the case as regards the size of public debt. When looking for reasons behind
the substantial growth in public debt to GDP rates after 1973, Denmark does not, therefore,
constitute a ’special case’. New theories based on various political-economy models of
government behaviour have offered some explanations why public debt has increased so much
in many countries. For example, it has been found that in countries with a frequent turn over
of government power, each government is likely to overspend  when in power, thereby leaving
a higher public debt to its successor (see Alesina and Tabellini, 1989). In particular, as
demonstrated by Roubini and Sachs (1989), coalition governments tend to have the largest
deficits, thus suggesting that if the government is formed by parties of different colour it is
difficult to agree on painful measures to keep the budget balanced. Since Denmark for most of
the period since 1973 has had minority governments made up of more than one party, the
record of public debt in Denmark is not inconsistent with the explanation of the deficit bias in
fiscal policy as offered here.
Since the convergence criteria for EMU qualification became guidelines for the conduct of
macro policy in Europe, Denmark has like other EU countries  – despite its reservations for
34
EMU participation – steered its fiscal policy with a view to the public debt to GDP targets
implied by the debt and deficit criteria. It would, however, take us far beyond the scope of this
chapter to seriously discuss the role of the Maastricht Treaty as an appropriate device for
enhancing fiscal responsibility. 
Two tax reforms have been enacted within the last decade or so.8 The first reform was
introduced in 1987 and had as its prime objective stimulating saving, with the ultimate goal of
bringing the ongoing foreign debt accumulation to a halt.  In particular, although the reform
did not attack the right to deduct all interest expenses from taxable income, the tax value of
interest expenses was cut, corresponding to the lowest marginal tax rate of the income tax
system (see section 1.5).
Tax reform was also a key ingredient in the policy package of the new centre-left government
taking office in January 1993.  That reform largely followed the recommendations put forward
in the report from the Tax Reform Committee (1992). It was designed in the same spirit as
most other tax reforms introduced in the OECD area in recent years, namely cuts in marginal
income tax rates financed through various measures to broaden the tax base. Also in line with
most other tax reforms in the OECD area, the Danish reform has led to a drop in the degree of
tax progressivity.  Detailed examinations of the 1993 tax reform include Lange, Pedersen and
Sørensen (Chapter 5 in this volume) and Knudsen et al. (1997). 
The reform has been phased in over a period of five years.  By 1998, the reform promised a
maximum marginal tax rate on labour income of 58 per cent, to be compared to the pre-reform
maximum marginal tax rate of 68 per cent. However, due to the introduction of so-called
'labour market contributions'  - which are virtually payroll taxes, amounting to 8 per cent of
gross labour income - the fall in the effective marginal tax rates is relatively modest.
Specifically, since the personal income tax  is levied on labour income net of payroll taxes, 
the effective marginal tax rate for high levels of personal income (above 234,900 kroner) is
61.4 per cent. The revenues from the payroll taxes are earmarked for various labour market
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initiatives, including unemployment insurance, active labour market programmes - and
sickness and maternity benefits.  It has been estimated that the reform will lead to a fall in the
ratio of income tax revenue-GDP from 26 per cent in 1993 to 21 per cent in 1998.
From an international perspective a novelty of the reform is the introduction of environmental
fees. The so-called ‘green taxes’ are levied on households (most important is the tax on water
consumption), but the emission of carbon dioxides from the business sector is also subject to
taxation. Since Denmark was among the first countries in the world to impose green taxes on
the business sector, there has been a lively debate on what impact it would have on Danish
companies exposed to international competition, particularly the most energy-intensive part of
industry (see Jensen, 1998). 
Overall, the 1993 reform is regarded as a revenue neutral broadening of the tax base, and the
introduction of payroll taxes has been motivated by the need to harmonize Denmark's tax
structure with the rest of the EU.  The reformed tax structure is also relevant to the domestic
debate about the need for welfare reforms.  Indeed, the tax system may have crucial effects on
incentives  to work and hire, savings behaviour, the ‘black’ economy, do-it-yourself activities
and so on.  Finally, it should be noted that the introduction of payroll taxes and other
earmarked budget items represent a departure from the principle of centrally pooled public
finances.
Current debates on future tax reforms centre around the question of whether wage taxes can
be replaced by green taxes to an even larger extent than has already taken place, thereby
reaping a so-called ‘double dividend’ in the sense of both improving labour market structures
and helping the environment. Also, the issue of making further cuts in the taxation of capital
income (including corporate taxes) and (imputed) returns to owner-occupied housing has been
put on the agenda.  If implemented, this would be accompanied by initiatives to limit the
deductability of interest expenses. 
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While such initiatives can be seen as natural extensions of the tax reforms of the 1980s and
the 1990s, a more radical approach to tax reform has also been heard, namely the so-called
‘flat tax’ (FT) (Hall and Rabushka, 1985, and Nielsen, Frederiksen and Lassen, Chapter 4 in
this volume). Basically, as suggested by its name, the FT proposal involves giving up the
progression built into the tax system currently prevailing in Denmark, and placing instead a
single fixed tax on wages and cash flows in domestic firms. Nielsen et al. have calculated that
a flat tax rate of 44 per cent would suffice to generate the same revenue as the current tax
system generated in Denmark in 1992, even under an ’no change in behaviour’ assumption. If
allowing for efficiency gains likely to accompany a reform of that kind, such as increases in
labour supply and saving, the FT rate might be even lower.
Compared to current tax system, the FT system would thus have the advantages of 
(a) reducing the administrative burden, (b) generating a given revenue at lower marginal tax
rates and (c) removing some asymmetries. On the negative side, however, a switch towards a
FT system would involve some adverse distributive effects which eventually might render it
undesirable. The ’traditional’ trade-off between efficiency and distribution thus also seems to
be present here. Nevertheless, if supplemented by initiatives to preserve the redistributive
properties of the current tax and transfer system, a future tax reform along the lines suggested
by the FT system might be worth considering. 
1.7 THE WELFARE STATE AND MARGINALIZATION
The redistributive capacity of the Danish tax and transfer system is quite significant. Although
the distribution of incomes between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ is not particularly equal, even before
taxes and transfers, the distribution of disposable incomes has been found to be much more
equal (see Førster, 1994).  Unlike what has been found in several other OECD countries, the
redistributive effects of taxes and transfers seem to be enhanced by the provision of public
services, such as education and subsidized child-care (see OECD, 1996).
37
While this would normally be regarded as attractive properties of the tax and transfer system,
the question is whether the extensive welfare system in Denmark has a negative impact on the
microeconomic balance of the economy, such as providing disincentives to work. This
question appears to be an important one as there has, over the past three decades or so, been a
rather sharp increase in the number of working-age persons being dependent on income
transfers from the public sector, now amounting to about a quarter of the working-age
population.
Table 1.4 summarizes some facts about the total number of working-age (15-66) persons,
persons in employment, recipients of public transfers (divided into various categories) and, as
a residual,  the number of ‘non-recipients’ within that age-group.
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Table 1.4: Working-age population, employment and recipients of public
                  transfer payments, 1960-97
1960 1970 1975 1980 1990 1995 1997
       (thousands of persons aged 15 - 66)
A. Working-age population 2,968 3,232 3,329 3,427 3,596 3,682 3,721
B. Employment 2,137 2,341 2,338 2,442 2,564 2,521 2,603
C. Recipients of public transfers 184 307 496 634 784 961 908
    Unemployment benefits 31 24 108 159 217 238 183
    Cash benefits 39 41 77 107 116 138 129
        - hereof unempl. 8 5 23 25 55 51 37
    Rehabilitation benefits - - - 9 22 16 16
    Early retirement benefits - - - 54 104 120 136
    Transitory benefits - - - - - 23 43
    Leave benefits - - - - - 77 46
        - hereof education - - - - - 28 22
    Early retirement pension 103 205 259 236 251 271 272
    Sickness benefits 10 29 37 54 43 42 49
    Maternity benefits 3 9 16 16 32 36 35
D. Non-recipients (A - B - C) 647 584 495 351 248 200 210
(% of persons aged 15-66)
E. Employment ratio (B/A*100) 72.0 72.4 70.2 71.3 71.3 68.5 70.0
F. Recipient ratio (C/A*100) 6.2 9.5 14.9 18.6 21.8 26.1 24.4
G. Non-recipient ratio (D/A*100) 21.8 18.1 14.9 10.2 6.9 5.4 5.6
Source: Ministry of Finance (1997), own calculations.
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Between 1960 and 1997, the population of working-age (15-66) has increased by 750.000
persons. While total employment has increased by 460.000 persons, largely concentrated within
the public sector, unemployment has over the same period risen by 150.000 persons. In
addition to the rise in unemployment, there has been a steep growth in the number of recipients
of other public transfer payments - that is, benefits not explicitly related to unemployment; for
more details (see Søndergaard, Chapter 10 in this volume).
This phenomenon is strongly associated with developments in the public pension system. In
particular, there has been a sharp rise in the number of recipients of early retirement pension,
from 103.000 in 1960 to 272.000 in 1997.  This scheme includes persons who for health or
social reasons are unable to participate in the labour market. Likewise, the number of recipients
of early retirement benefits has increased greatly since the inception of this scheme in 1979.
These benefits are available to persons aged 60 and above provided they have been members of
an unemployment insurance fund for at least 20 years. As a more recent phenomenon,
arrangements have been introduced which enable members of the labour force to take paid
leave up to one year, either for child-minding or for participation in education and training
programmes. On their introduction the leave schemes proved rather popular, as reflected by the
fact that about 80.000 persons (more than 2 per cent of the labour force) participated by the end
of 1995, but as a result of various tightenings thereafter the number of participants in 1997 had 
fallen to about 40.000 persons.  See Andersen, Appeldorn and Weise (1996) for a detailed
study of the leave schemes. 
A large number of persons also receive cash benefits, available to uninsured unemployed
persons from households with an income and wealth below a certain threshold.  In principle,
cash benefits are granted on the condition that the recipients are available to the labour market.
However, the numbers show that less than a third of those receiving cash benefits are actually
registered as unemployed.  The rest would normally be regarded as permanently excluded from
the labour market. 
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The upshot of these developments is that the so-called ‘recipient ratio’ (the number of
recipients of public transfers as a percentage of the total number of working-age persons) has
risen dramatically over the years, from 6.2 per cent in 1960 to 27.7 per cent in 1995. The good
news, however, is that the ratio has actually been falling since 1995, albeit only on a small
scale.
Against this, it would be relevant to know how many of those recipients actually have the
ability to work. Indeed, some critics have interpreted the above numbers as evidence that the
‘true’ rate of unemployment is much higher than the registered rate. For example, Ølgaard
(1995) has argued that about 18 per cent of all working-age persons are non-employed but
should in principle have the ability to work. While many recipients of public transfers have
their status because of disabilities of various kinds, and hence are unable to participate actively
in the labour market, it is undoubtedly true that others could, if offered, take a job. From a
social viewpoint, it would count as an enormous success if marginalized people could change
their status from a passive life on welfare money to a more active and independent life. From a
broader economic perspective such a process would not only help in improving government
finances, but would also ease the current pressure on the labour market in Denmark where
some sectors now appear to be operating at the margin of full capacity utlilization. 
Less pessimistic conclusions have also been drawn from this evidence. For example,  as Table
1.4 shows, it has been noticed that the employment rate (the share of of working-age people in
employment) has proved very stable since the early 1960s. Hence, the rise in unemployment is
closely related to the rise in the labour force. In particular, the phenomenon must be seen in the
light of the significant increase in the labour market participation rate among women. While
this is true, it could be said that a well functioning labour market should be capable of
absorbing such an influx to the labour market.
It has also been argued that rather than associating the enormous rise in the number of
recipients of public transfers with a dramatic increase in de facto unemployment, it simply
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reflects a change in political priorities in favour of granting public benefits to persons who
previously would have been provided for by family or other ‘local’ safety nets, if provided for
at all (see Callesen, 1995) .  Hence it is a result of the expansion of the welfare state, as
indicated by the dramatic fall in the so-called ‘non-recipient’ ratio in Table 1.4. In other words,
a person of working-age who is not working and who is not a recipient of welfare money is
today almost a non-existing phenomenon.  It is difficult to judge the impact of this
development on social welfare.
From a social viewpoint,  the perhaps most important problem facing today's society is the
number of truly marginalized persons or social outcasts.  These individuals are typically
concentrated in certain inner-city areas and many of them are second-generation immigrants.
The real challenge to the welfare system in the coming years is to bring this marginalization
process to a halt. While basically a matter of definition, the question about the ‘true’ number of
marginalized individuals has become subject to controversy among different policy-creating
communities in Denmark. For example, the so-called Welfare Commission (1995) found that
250.000 persons were truly marginalized in 1995, a number also reported by the Social
Research Instititute. Using an alternative definition, the Ministry of Finance (1995, 1997)
reports a much lower number for 1994, namely 104.000, a number projected to fall to 40.000
by 1999. 
Since it is the rise in public transfer payments which explain why public expenditures have
risen over the years, the following question often arises: 'can we really afford to pay these
transfers?' It is certainly true that the rise in expenditures allocated to public transfers has not
only led to higher (marginal) tax rates, but it may also have crowded out expenditures which
might otherwise have been allocated to public consumption, including the provision of various
services and investments in infrastructure etc.  While high marginal tax rates are well known to
have distortionary effects, a continuous fall in the share of expenditures to public service
production and infrastructure relative to public transfer payments may in the longer term
threaten the legitimacy of the welfare state (see Ingerslev and Ploug, 1996). The point is that
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many so-called middle-class persons/families may find it increasingly difficult to see their tax
money being spent on transfer payments - from which they themselves may derive only little
utility - instead of being spent on public services - from which they are likely to derive a lot
more utility. 
Another criticism frequently raised is this: 'it doesn't really pay to work any more!' In general,
the incentives offered by the welfare system to participate in the labour market are rather
mixed. On the one hand, the combination of generous unemployment benefits and relatively
long benefit periods should induce people to enter the workforce. Moreover, government
subsidization of daycare for children adds to this incentive.  On the other hand, the early
retirement benefits would typically operate in the opposite direction. Indeed, this scheme has
contributed strongly to reducing the effective retirement age from nearly 66 in 1979 (the year
when the early retirement benefits were introduced) to about 61 in 1997.
A recent study by Pedersen, Smith and Stephensen (1998 - and Chapter 6 this volume) shows
that 20 per cent of the insured people in work in Denmark have no or only weak economic
incentives to remain in employment. Similarly, unemployed persons receiving the maximum
UI benefits have only little, if any, economic incentive to accept low-paid jobs, since the
benefits typically exceed the minimum wage in the manual labour market (see also section 1.3). 
1.8 POPULATION AGEING AND INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION
In addition to the pressure on public finances induced by the large number of working-age
recipients of public transfers, the projected changes in the age structure of the population are
likely to challenge the fiscal system.  Indeed, the trends of modest economic growth, high real
interest rates, ageing populations and high levels of (existing) public debt have led many
economists to question the long term sustainability of fiscal policy as currently practised.  A
closely related issue is whether, and to what extent, financial burdens are passed onto future
generations if current fiscal policies continue without adjustments.   Since changing
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demographics are the major driving force behind the threats to public finances in the future, we
start with a brief look at the population projections. Following standard age demarcations we
may define the working age population as those between the ages of 20 and 64, the elderly
population as those aged 65 and above, and the very old as those aged 80 and above.  It is most
interesting to look at the development in the ratio of elderly to working-age persons, N65+/N20,64,
and the ratio of very old to the general population of elderly, N80+/N65+. While the development
in the former ratio provides information about the general ageing process, the latter tells which
of either the young or the old group of elderly is growing most rapidly.  If both ratios are rising
at the same time, we have the phenomenon often referred to as ‘double ageing’.   Both ratios
are displayed in Figure 1.14, for a  projection period ranging from 1997 to 2030.
Sources: Statistics Denmark, own calculations.
The first remarkable observation is the ‘J-shaped’ nature of the N65+/N20,64 trajectory:  over the
next 10 years or so the overall demographic dependency burden is falling, whereupon it
increases rather dramatically.  By international comparison, the prospect of a demographic
‘breathing space’ is rather unique.  Second, there seems to be a tendency for the two curves to
move in different directions, at least over the next 25 years: during the first 10-15 years, the
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share of the very old is rising, and when general ageing sets in, the share of the very old is
falling. From about 2020, however, there will be some ‘double ageing’ in Denmark.
From an economic perspective, the apparent absence of double ageing until 2020 may be quite
important. Evidence shows, see Socialkommissionen (1993), that there is a strong positive
relationship between age of the elderly and public outlays on old-age services.  The point is, of
course, that very old persons' need for medical care, home care, etc. is substantially higher than
young elderly's need for those services.
To get a first impression of the budgetary significance of population ageing, we may treat
government outlays to the elderly as if they constitute a separate government budget.  Under a
pay-as-you-go financing scheme, the per-period budget constraint says that current government
spending on the elderly must be equal to the taxes levied on working-age persons. Recent
evidence shows that, given realistic indexation schemes of per capita spending on services and
income transfers to the elderly, the taxes needed to cover all old-age expenditures would rise
from about 11 per cent of GDP in 1993 to about 15 per cent of GDP in 2030 (see Ministry of
Finance, 1995, and Jensen and Nielsen, 1995).  A more detailed analysis of the relevant issues
is offered by Jensen, Hansen and Junge (Chapter 6 in this volume).
The overall effects of changing demographics may also be studied using the device of
generational accounting.  Recent work has studied the requirements put on fiscal policy in
order to ensure that current and future generations are burdened equally (see Jensen and
Raffelhüschen, 1997, 1998). Hardly surprising, the main finding  is that in order to equalize the
fiscal burdens on newborns and future generations, current generations would have to face
tighter fiscal policies.  More concretely, the required fiscal tightening is quantifed to a rise of
3.4 per cent in the revenue from all taxes; or a cut in of 4.7 per cent in all tranfer payments,  or
a cut in the level of government consumption of almost 10 per cent (see Jensen and
Raffelhüschen, 1998). 
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While this might suggest that fiscal policy in Denmark is strongly intergenerationally
imbalanced, it has also been demonstrated that if unemployment rates could be brought further
down, this could have very positive effects on the generational stance of fiscal policy. A
condition for this is of course that the additional taxes paid by current generations are spent in a
sensible way - that is, to bring down existing public debt so that future generations will be
burdened less. The tax reform of act of 1993 also seems to help redressing the generational
imbalance, see Lange, Pedersen and Sørensen (Chapter 5 in this volume). 
The question is what else can be done to temper the effects of population ageing.  In view of
the breathing space, Denmark seems to have a unique opportunity for improving the fiscal
positions over the next decade - that is, to bring down public debt relatively fast.  Also in the
area of public pensions, some policy options are open. However, since for at least half of
today's pensioners, and for at least a third of pensioners 30 years from now, the public pension
benefit will represent the only (or certainly the most important) means of old-age security, it is
difficult to think of a significant fall in the replacement rate being possible.  Instead, an obvious
measure would be to raise the retirement age.  In particular, this would involve a reform of the
so-called early retirement benefit scheme.
At a more general level, it seems that the appropriate policy response to the ageing effect would
be to increase the workforce.  In that respect, the apparent constancy of the employment rate
over the last three decades may have serious implications for the extent to which the ageing
problem can be overcome by expanding the workforce.  Indeed, if it is a ‘stylized fact’ that the
employment rate is virtually decoupled from the growth in the workforce, it would be pointless
to induce people to postpone their retirement from the labour market.  From the point of view
of economic theory, however, it would be very hard to believe in such a peculiar relationship in
the medium-to-long run.
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1.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the last 25 years the Danish economy has had difficulties in growing as fast as other EU
countries and the United States. While the average growth difference is small, it signals that if
this trend persists into the next century, Denmark will not be able to maintain its high position
in the world income hierarchy. Moreover, during these years, the number of individuals living
on transfer incomes have increased dramatically. Although we interpret both tendencies as
signals of structural weaknesses, we are also aware that these developments may reflect that
other goals in economic policy have been pursued, such as protecting the environment and/or 
achieving certain redistributive objectives.
The Danish experience shows that economic policy has significant effects on the economy.
Thus the upturns in the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s were both intimately linked to policy
reforms. Similarly, the recession starting in 1987 was also to a large extent caused by economic
policy. Hence, it does matter what governments do. In particular, while the scope for pursuing
macroeconomic stabilisation policies in traditional sense may be limited, a lot can be done in
the area of structural reform.
The current upturn in the Danish economy is of great interest since it has to some extent been
underpinned by structural reforms, mainly in the labour market. Although the current business
cycle situation is favourable, it is not realistic that growth can be maintained without further
policy initiatives. Further labour market reforms are essential both for the direct effect on
unemployment and the possibility of giving a larger group of the population a genuine chance
of entering the labour market, but also for the indirect effects it has on the public budget. It is
not realistic to make substantial improvements in public finances without a reduction in the
number of individuals on transfers. In a longer-term perspective this will also be an important
step in creating leeway to deal with the problems of an ageing population. 
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As part of the reform policy further tax reforms are needed both to strengthen the incentive to
work and to save. It is also important to continue the deregulation process to ensure more
competition in product markets and to create a more flexible and efficient public sector. For a
society aiming at a high and fairly equally distributed living standard, it is essential in a world
of intensified international competition that the labour force has a level and distribution of
qualifications which makes it possible to attain this target on market terms. An important
challenge for the future may thus be to have an efficient and flexible educational system to
ensure that qualifications relevant for the labour market are provided.
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1.Forthcoming in T.M. Andersen, S.E.H. Jensen and O. Risager (eds), Macroeconomic
Perspectives on the Danish Economy, (MacMillan, London). Comments from Per Callesen, Ole
Jørgensen, Jan Olesen and Peter Birch Sørensen are gratefully acknowledged. We also thank
Christoffer Kok Sørensen for highly effective research assistance.
2 The importance of economic policy for the behaviour of the economy and for welfare in general
is an important motivator for this book. Thus, we believe that a better understanding lay the
foundation for better policies that may improve the Danish citizens’ economic well-being. 
3 Countries participating in the ERM of the EMS fix a parity relative to the ECU. The
exchange rate was initially allowed to fluctuate around this parity by ±2.25 per cent, but after
the European exchange rate crisis in 1993 this was widened to ±15 per cent,  effectively
meaning that the bands are now non-binding.
4Because the new National Accounts only cover the short period 1988-96, we are forced to use
the old figures to get a historical perspective. However, the old figures are also likely to be
more reliable the further we move back in time. IT investments were, for instance, of much
less importance 10 years ago. Another difference between the two systems is the use of base
year; the old system is based on 1980 which is fine in (say) 1986, but probably not in 1993,
and the new system therefore uses 1990 as a base year. Finally, there has also been a sectoral
redefinition.
4 Notice that this is the case where there is a default risk usually ignored in the intertemporal
deterministic approach, but nobody can afford to ignore this in the real world.
6 As to the principles of taxation, Denmark was the first Nordic country to move away from
the principle of global income taxation  where a single progressive tax schedule is applied to
the sum of the taxpayer's income from all sources  toward a system of so-called dual income
taxation  where the taxation of capital income is separated from the taxation of other sources
of income (see Sørensen, 1994).
7 Discussions of public debt are often confused by the fact that several alternative definitions
are offered. The debt ratio mentioned here refers to what is called ‘gross government debt’
which includes the government's outstanding (domestic and foreign) debt in the form of
bonds. This is different from the so-called ‘EMU debt’, used by the EU for inter-country
comparisons, and which in 1996 constituted 69.9 per cent of GDP. If some specific Danish
institutional features are allowed for, including a state-owned pension fund's holdings of non-
government bonds and the state's deposits in Danmarks Nationalbank, the ratio actually falls
below 60 per cent. 
Notes
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7 Further details on  recent tax reforms in Denmark are provided by Sørensen (1990, 1994) , 
Matthiessen  (1994)  and Lange, Pedersen and Sørensen (Chapter 5 in this volume). 
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